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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 18/81)

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INTERNATIONAL

BOVIN ON FUTURE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, PRC, U.S., POLAND

Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 22 Apr 81 pp 7-9

[Interview with IZVESTIA Editorial Committee Member Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] The MAINICHI conferred, on the 21st, with Editorial Committee member Aleksandr Bovin of IZVESTIA, the organ paper of the Soviet Government, who is now visiting Japan, and sought of him explanations mainly on the Soviet Union's recent policy toward Asia. Bovin, admitting that military units are stationed in the northern territory, clarified the following views: 1) The Soviet attitude toward the northern territory problem has not at all changed. The Soviet Union will not respond to [the request] for the reversion thereof, for military reasons, too; 2) Japan-Soviet relations at present are at a low level, but the recovery of the degree of trust through diversified exchange and the improvement of relations between them, will lead to peace in Asia as a whole; 3) The Soviet Union will continue persevering efforts for the "strengthening of trust" in the Far East, and 4) The Soviet Union will absolutely not permit the Reagan Administration to establish military superiority over the Soviet Union, which that administration is aiming at. The Soviet Union will take measures to oppose it, regardless of what economic difficulties it will face.

Bovin, known as a brain truster of Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Brezhnev, is an authority as an expert on international problems. He is in the position to clarify the Soviet Government's basic stand. This time, he has come to Japan in order to explain to various circles in Japan policies after the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February.

The outline of the questions and answers is as follows:

Question: Chairman Brezhnev, at the Soviet Communist Party Congress in February, proposed the taking of measures for the strengthening of relations of trust in the Far East. Is it possible to view that the proposal was made, hypothesizing, for example, something like a conference to be taken part in by Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States?

Answer: Chairman Brezhnev's proposal is very general. For example, he proposed to Europe the reduction of armaments. His proposal created reactions in Europe, and it is grasped as a useful proposal. I think that it will be good, if this kind of structure is established in other parts of the world, such

as the Far East area, for example. It is probably necessary to hold talks among Japan, China, and Korea, and also by inviting the United States which has military bases in various nations in Asia. As a big premise for that, various nations must agree to take measures for the strengthening of trust. Problems, such as who will participate in such a conference and where it will be held, will come after that.

Question: However, if we look at the present situation in the Far East, is it not that there is hardly any situation which permits the holding of such a conference?

Answer: I understand it, but as many as 30 years were necessary before the way of thinking on taking security measures in Europe was realized at the Helsinki Conference. Even if we must walk a long distance, the first one step is necessary. The Brezhnev proposal carries big significance.

Question: Japan-Soviet relations have greatly worsened. What view do you take?

Answer: Japan-Soviet relations are at a very low level at present. This is not in the interests of the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union, either. We must explore ways to developing relations between the two countries, by expanding exchanges in the fields of politics, the economy, culture and science and technology, and by recovering the degree of trust. We take a realistic way of thinking. We can see objectively the fact that there are difficulties at present, but we think that these difficulties should not affect Japan-Soviet relations as a whole in the future. The clarification of Japan-Soviet relations will probably contribute greatly toward peace in Asia.

Question: The Soviet Navy in the Sea of Japan is being strengthened, and military aid is being extended to other nations. Japan, on its part, cannot be unconcerned about them. What is your view?

Answer: It is true that there is military power in the Far East. However, we want you to understand our position. There are still tense relations with China. Moreover, military personnel always hypothesize the worst case. It is difficult for us, on our part, to oppose it. Furthermore, we do not view Japan as an isolated existence. Japan is the forefront of the U.S. military strategy. In Japan, there are 500 U.S. military facilities and 50,000-man forces. Japan is being gradually incorporated into the U.S. strategy. In 1978, the guidelines for Japan-U.S. military cooperation were formulated, which enabled the MSDF to take part in joint maneuvers. These things may not yet be serious, but we are worried about this trend. We can explain, with this point, why the Far East Fleet of the Soviet Union has become active. We hope that Japan will realize and give thought to this point.

The Soviet Union's military aid is a very difficult problem. In the Third World, there are still political struggles. Nations outside the Third World, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, have concern in the struggles.

The Soviet Union thinks that it has an obligation to help people who are aiming at securing freedom and independence. We are merely fulfilling our obligations in Angola, Ethiopia, etc., even if the United States is not pleased with this. However, there is a problem which is more important than it. That is the problem of eliminating the possibility of a world war and applying a brake on the armaments race. (Concerning aid to the Third World), it may be necessary to establish something like rules, and to think of a way to promote the easing of tension, at the same time.

Review of Territorial Problem Rejected

Question: It is said that armaments are being strengthened in the northern territories....

Answer: I do not think that there is strong military power. It depends upon how to view it, but is it possible to possess strong military power in an area which is not so large? I, as an individual, do not know whether or not military power has been strengthened recently. At the bottom of this problem, there is probably the problem of securing safe navigation in the Pacific. If the United States is seeking of Japan the "closing" of the way out to the Pacific, we must secure the way out.

Question: Does it mean that the northern territory cannot be returned for military reasons?

Answer: There is an important problem. That is, the Soviet Union takes the basic position of rejecting all proposals which call for the review of territories which were established as a result of World War II. We made strenuous efforts for 30 years so as to have Europe understand this position. We stood firm for 30 years. This way of thinking was approved at the Helsinki Conference, at long last. Is it not strange if we call for this way of thinking, on one hand, and if we reject it, on the other hand? In Asia, too, we take the position of preserving our political and geographic borders after World War II.

Question: I want to ask your view on Sino-Soviet relations. In the past, you said that Sino-Soviet relations will be normalized in around the middle of the 1980's. Does your view remain unchanged even at present?

Answer: It remains completely unchanged. What is now occurring in China at present will sooner or later bring about changes in its foreign policy. Sino-Soviet relations will probably move in the direction of being normalized gradually. Changes will probably start to appear around the middle of the 1980's.

Question: The Reagan Administration is aiming to strengthen the armaments of the West. There is the view that in case the West promotes an armaments-expansion line thorough-goingly, the Soviet Union may not be able to catch up with it economically....

Answer: I want you to transmit to persons who say such a thing that it is not necessary for them to be worried, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. The Soviet Union will never permit the United States to enjoy military

superiority in the future, either. Certainly, we will face a difficult situation, and it will become necessary for us to make efforts. However, in our world, there are problems which are more important than economic difficulties. The problem of national security itself is the most important.

If the United States starts to accumulate military power which will exceed that of ours in the military field, we will naturally take the same course. Although regrettable, that is the logic of an armaments race. We are opposed to this logic, and we are calling for the lowering of the present level. If the United States is to take the course of expanding armaments, in defiance of our call, we cannot but take the same course.

Question: Concerning the situation in Poland, there are rumors that the Soviet Union will resort to direct action. What is your view?

Answer: That is groundless. The Polish situation, which has been thrown into confusion, is complex. We think that our comrades in Poland will settle their own problems. This is our basic position.

CSO: 4105/172

INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET REGIME'S EXPANSIONISM ANALYZED

Cologne BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN in German 81 No 6, cover page, T/C, pp 1-23

[Article by Astrid von Borcke: "How Expansionist Is the Soviet Regime? Western Perceptions and Eastern Realities"]

[Text] The opinions expressed in the publications of the Federal Institute of Eastern and International Studies are exclusively those of the author.

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1. Afghanistan and the Revolution of Perceptions: From Coexistence to Hegemonial Policy?

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan[1] has just about triggered a "revolution of perceptions" in the West and especially in the United States. The big question, which now dominates public discussion in the United States, is this: is the Soviet Union really a "mature state" and is it "saturated" or is it perhaps "revisionist," revolutionary, if not downright criminal? Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt warned against another "1914"; along with Gen A. Haig, H. Kissinger, asked himself whether the Soviet Union is not at the threshold of a new imperial era; certain observers are already afraid of another "1939."

The sudden change in public judgment regarding the Soviet Union is dramatic. From 1953 until Carter's presidential term, people in the United States had assumed that the Soviet Union is basically a conservative state. Tensions and conflicts with it were believed to be based in the final analysis on legitimate conflicts of interest for which there were supposed to be fundamentally bearable compromises; the main threat supposedly came from misinterpretations and mistakes in actions taken.

The experience of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was quickly pushed to the sidelines in view of the on-going SALT negotiations. To be sure, American domestic-policy calculations were not absent either; Kissinger thought that one must not leave the watchword of "peace" to one's enemies because of the crisis triggered by Vietnam. But the predominant hope basically was that one could convert the Soviet system by means of "bridge-building" and "commitment." Reference was made to symptoms of a beginning "repluralization" of the system which once upon a time passed itself off as "monolithic." Soviet Russia's increasing ties with the international system, its gradual opening toward the West presumably would only further these highly promising beginnings. Theories as to a convergence of the systems--mostly in favor of Western values--even became popular.

The optimists were above all looking to the future. The obvious limitations of the Stalinist command economy and the requirements of a modern industrial, yes, even "postindustrial" society seemed to make change inevitable. The solution of that system's basic problem--the killing of the social dash and verve--that is something which obviously Khrushchev already had come to feel and that demanded the restructuring also of relationships with and among the authorities, so to speak, the conversion from "mechanistic" to cybernetic ways of action. In a quasi-Marxist spirit, the power of the structures in this kind of approach was mostly overlooked; people forgot that the Soviet Union is not only a planned economy but also a special political system.

The pessimists of today on the other hand again stress the historical origins of that system: Russia's state tradition, the special dynamics of a revolutionary single-party regime. The stress on "national might" by the Soviet Union, as well as its militarism remind us of the "compensatory" imperialism of other big continental states, such as Napoleon's France, the German Reich starting at around 1890, and last but not least tsarist Russia itself[2].

The reference to "1939" at least implicitly once again brings out the concept of totalitarianism which was in the doghouse for a long time, in other words, the

comparison between the Stalin regime and the Hitler regime. Is not such an ideological system "by virtue of its very nature" in an unresolvable relation of tension with respect to its environment, especially the pluralist societies?

But reality is complex. Undoubtedly, both elements of the optimistic and elements of the pessimistic interpretation in the politics of the Soviet system are in effect; the question only is what their particular weight happens to be.

2. Coexistence and 'Ideological Struggle'--The Conflict of Political Cultures

The main obstacle on the way to a real detente, it seems, was the Soviet insistence on the lasting "ideological" and "social" conflict; in other words, they reserved themselves the right to undermine the societies of the outside world in spite of "state" [government] cooperation. No rules of the game were devised especially for crisis management in the "Third World" toward which the competition among the systems had increasingly shifted in view of the strategic standoff and political stability at the "center." The Soviet ideologists here saw the dilemma of the "reason of state" more clearly than their seemingly pragmatic counterparts: the conflict between the requirements of military national security in the shape of joint nuclear crisis management and the threat to values legitimizing their system which results from any cooperation with the other side. Today, the United States is discussing the antinomy of "national security" and "human rights"; the Soviet Union years ago had addressed itself to its analogous dilemma of "coexistence" and "world-revolutionary process." Both systems basically seek access to the society of the other side in order thus to bring their own values to bear and in order thus also to improve their own political situation. It was not likely that this labile "synthesis" of cooperation and conflict could stand up in the long run.

Political observers on both sides were inclined to view the problems and priorities, the values and political processes of the other side again and again through the "glasses" of their own political "life and world," which means that further misinterpretations were just about preprogrammed. The Soviets suspect hegemonial plans, secret central control mechanisms, omnipotent intelligence services with a lust for subversion that can hardly be kept under control, and specifically target-oriented propaganda campaigns, etc., in the West--all of which are directed in a coordinated fashion against the Soviet system. Western and especially American observers detect, in the Soviet system, beginnings of pluralism, "interest groups," bureaucratic policy according to their own domestic patterns, etc.[3]. This (entirely too human) "ethnocentrism" clouded the view of the actual motivations, possibilities, and probable reactions of the other side.

Basically, there are two opposing political cultures which are locked in a dispute here. They do not have the same concepts of order, of the essence of political matters, and they do not have the same goals.

For Lenin's ideology, with its quasi-enlightenment struggle over "consciousness," the main enemies were "spontaneity," pluralism, and liberalism[4]. Connected with this was another concept of politics, other than the liberal one. The liberal-constitutional tradition had stressed "the rules of the game" and formal procedures; revolutionary Leninism is aimed at pushing through "substantial" values. It tends toward a radical "responsibility ethics" (M. Weber): "The end sanctifies the means"

--or (as Lenin put it) anything that is good for the revolution is moral. Stalin was fascinated by the Nechayev affair which had for the first time unavoidably confronted the Russian radicals of the 19th century with the problem of revolutionary reason (see Dostoyevskiy's "Demons, Guilt, and Atonement"; he was also fascinated by Macchiavelli, the theoretician of reason of state. Politics for him was the art of the attainable, diplomacy was just about the art of the lie. Politics in Leninist thinking is struggle, class struggle, conflict, almost the continuation of war with other means.

This revolutionary thinking basically began to lose its raison d'etre upon the end of the (second) revolution from the top in Russia--formally already with the constitution of 1936, once again confirmed by Khrushchev's new 1961 party program. Society (now transformed) had to gain inherent value (R. Ahlberg)--something which historically is the basic prerequisite for any start toward pluralism. In this way, all conflicts of interest could no longer be described as fundamentally illegitimate in the long run. In the meantime, demands have also been voiced for ethics "independent of classes." The party's integration into practical management likewise promoted a new kind of "bargaining," a new kind of self-concept as to its role as a broker[5]. The ideological assertion of a particularly uniquely correct "line" in any specific situation became problematical--and thus, implicitly, it became the legitimization of any form of "enlightened despotism" (toward which Leninism was inclined, impressed as it was by the Russian "enlightenment followers" of the 1860's). But the party continued to assert the "substantial rationality" of the system as a whole, it continued to preserve the common political interests (the role of the state in the West). It thus claimed a right which, in liberal-democratic systems, is reserved for special procedures and institutions, that is, the definition of the guiding values.

The new, quasipluralist beginnings in politics in the form of an equalization of interests touched Soviet foreign-policy thinking at best in a marginal manner. Theoretically, Brezhnev knows that detente presupposes the ability "to include the legitimate interests of both sides in the calculations"[6]; but there is an essential difference regarding the political situation in domestic politics: the Soviet Union basically cannot recognize the legitimacy of different, especially pluralistic political systems. Quite characteristically, it has the habit of justifying coexistence only in utilitarian terms, but not in normative terms.

It likewise does not consider the existing international system to be its system. Originally, it wanted to overthrow it, then undermine it, and now it is ready to exploit it. But as a former "underdog" and as a recently arrived superpower, it expects to obtain basic advantages from change--in contrast to the United States, which, as a "power of law and order" in fact is bound to be oriented much more along status-quo lines. To that end, it is ready to place itself at the head of all anti-Western movements, to rally all "liberation forces" (M. V. Zimyanin)[7]. (This idea had quite characteristically already been approached by the Narodniki!)[8]. In short, its interest situation is different from that of the United States. Whether it has positive, constructive concepts of system arrangement of its own is doubtful[9] or such concepts exist in the projection and expansion of its own system. Its military efforts therefore have been interpreted just about as a backup guarantee for communist power seizures all over the world (C. G. Stroehm)[10]. Soviet theories on so-called national and bourgeois liberation wars seem to document that[11]. In the spirit of Mao, the theory has been advocated to the effect that the important

thing is to checkmate imperialism via the detour consisting of its raw material sources in the Third World[12]. Marshal Grechko already dreamed of pax sovietica[13].

There are cautious new approaches in foreign-policy thinking due to the effect of present-day realities and a growing although also subtle role of the Policy Advisory Institute introduced after the 20th Party Congress. That applies above all to thinking about atomic war which (as Khrushchev allowed already after Malenkov) would not stop in the face of the class principle or, as Brezhnev feared, would leave only "the yellow and the black races" as survivors[14]. There has also been a beginning toward the development of a sense of understanding of the international tie-ins of economic life. The traditional view of relationships between "socialism" and "capitalism" as a kind of "zero-sum game"--something that helps one side is bound therefore to be damaging to the other side--has become questionable in those sectors.

But especially during crises, the spontaneous reflex of any system is to fall back on trational patterns of thinking and action: that was clearly expressed also in the case of the Soviet Union in 1979[15] and in 1968.

The traditional Leninist concept of strategy (and politics) however is that of an "operational art" based on a quasimilitary pattern. (Lenin was an admirer of Clausewitz and Ludendorff!)[16]. The area of that which is possible is being scanned and expanded by means of a kind of constant "interdiction fire." That does not mean proceeding according to a "master plan" but it is nevertheless more than the mere exploitation of opportunities.

In short, the perceptions and the operating procedures of the Soviet leadership are still always also fashioned by its ideological-political heritage, a heritage which one should certainly take seriously (as the Soviets keep repeating over and over again). Macchiavelli already had expressed that idea which has been confirmed by modern organizational research in its own fashion: a state preserves itself by preserving the "idea" that led to its being founded. First of all, ideology fashioned the guiding values and thus also the structures of the regime. These structures then in turn required ideology in order to justify their lasting role. That applies primarily to the party which after all originally was not a body representing social interests--the heresy of "economism"--but rather a political fighting organization and which then took over the police, socialization, and coordination functions.

The ideal of the Communist Party--"rational" organization according to the mechanistic pattern (in contrast to cybernetic automatic control)--is basically the ideal of the bureaucracy and military thinking. The party works toward the "organized, planned buildup of communism," the "goal-oriented coordination of all parts of the social organism"[17]. Leninism's fundamental idea to this very day is to guide all society like a single organization in a "mono-organizational" manner (T. H. Ribgy)[18]. To the extent that Leninism "starts with humanity as a whole" (N. Inozemtsev)[19], we find, at the end of the road, in the idea case, one "worldwide economy based on planning" (J. Zedenbal)[20]. The utopia of a uniform, perfectly functioning organizational mechanism points to a secret "imperialist" thrust by large organizations and bureaucracies in general, quite apart from ideology. Because organizations are having trouble adjusting to novel requirements with their "standard operating

procedures," they are inclined toward preferring to force their own structures upon the environment rather than adjusting themselves to it, in other words, they are inclined to exercise power rather than to "learn"[21].

The ideal of modern, mechanistics (T. Burns and G. M. Stalker) organizational thinking basically is that "mathematically-accurate exclusion of any accident" which Napoleon himself had been talking about[22]. (The military establishment did belong to the pioneers of modern, rational organization!) This bureaucratic-organizational logic could be explained in the light of Soviet obsession with "security"; nothing is more hideous or eerie to Bolshevik position than any kind of accident or coincidence, anything unforseeable.

The organizational ethos of Bolshevism was a bridge toward militarization. Today, the military establishment is probably the institution which is closest to the party with relation to many of the regime's basic problems--big-power thinking, patriotism, socialization of the population and especially the younger generation, the nationalities issue, the planned economy (that is to say, primarily the traditionally-oriented but politically dominant ground forces). The military establishment has begun to play a key role in securing government rule, if necessary at home, but primarily in the Eastern European hegemonial region of the Soviet Union. Conversely, ideologists have found the military establishment to be the best weapon to promote their objective[23].

The revolution origin of the single-party regime brings about that rather odd relationship of tension between "state" and "movement." As a state, the regime is the heir of the territory of its tsarist predecessors (which it was able considerably to expand) and it maintains conventional international relationships with other states. As a party regime it still feels that it is "a department of the international communist movement" (M. Suslov)[24]. Both traditions often can rather easily be placed in the service of a new big-power policy. At the same time there are potential tensions because the particular interests of the party apparatus are not always those of the state, for example, on questions of economic reform, regarding the attitude toward conflicts and wars (ideologists maintain to this very day that a nuclear war would only wipe out "capitalism!"), in politics dealing with the "Third World" (which costs a poor country dearly) and not least also with relation to the West and the United States.

It is the job of the political leadership to act as broker in managing these tensions between "party" and "government" for the sake of an "organizational relationship between the national interests of the Soviet Union and internationalism"[25]. The Politburo, the Soviet Union's real government, always and especially supervised foreign policy most strictly.

3. Typical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Union's Foreign-Policy Decision-Making Agencies

The Soviet Politburo a long time ago ceased to be made up of mere "ideologists." It now consists of men who pursue "politics as a profession" and who consider themselves to be realistic politicians. Brezhnev, a former political officer, a republic and Central Committee secretary, and finally also "head of state," was probably the best-prepared party boss when he took over the post of ousted Khrushchev

in October 1964. Chief ideologist Suslov likewise is a man with considerable administrative and power-political experience. Foreign Minister Gromyko, a pupil of Molotov and the head of Soviet diplomacy since 1957, is a master of his trade with whom any less experienced person finds it "suicidal" to negotiate (H. Kissinger)[26]--and who is not less experienced in dealing with Gromyko? Ustinov, director of the Soviet armament industry since 1941, is the "senior" expert in this field worldwide; Premier Kosygin, who died in December 1979, was just about an administrative genius; even an ideologist, such as Ponomarev, a man from the Komintern apparatus, is a master of bureaucratic politics; KGB [State Security Committee] boss Andropov, among other things, ambassador to Hungary at the time of the uprising in 1956 and director of the Central Committee department for the communist and worker parties of Eastern Europe in 1962-1967, is a foreign-policy expert. These examples might suffice.

But statesmen in office--as Kissinger stressed in the light of his own experience--live on their intellectual capital. Due to the pressure of deadlines, there is hardly any time to learn and study more; the urgent constantly triumphs over the important. One learns above all how one makes decisions but not so much what decisions one should work toward[27].

The "recruiting" and "socialization" of the leaders (the role of the nomenklatura, the decisive judgment of superiors, the necessary political reliability) like the structure and the operating procedure of the extremely centralized foreign-policy decision-making process, will establish narrow limits for innovative thinking.

On top of that we have the presently increasing need for considering "public opinion" in the apparatuses, especially the party, which by no means is bound to have a progressive effect, as indicated by the not infrequently extremist language of the political, ideological, and military publications for "domestic consumption."

In view of the growing repercussions of foreign-policy decisions also on domestic policy, the influence of the Central Committee has increased although traditionally it had hardly had any interest in foreign policy before. Today, the foreign-policy course is being repeatedly described as the "creative effort of the entire Central Committee"[28]. Last but not least thanks to its own information and propaganda policy, the leadership might have burdened itself with a following that is uninformed on foreign-policy matters but that is becoming increasingly active. The Central Committee can play an active role during times of crisis--usually probably with primarily consultative and transmission functions.

The Soviet regime's present-day dilemma is that, after years of extensive isolation from the world and in the absence of a well-developed systems of international transactions, it has no politically weighty "counter-elite" with an institutional interest in the expansion of contacts and cooperation with "capitalist" foreign countries[29]. The elements who would be most interested in that--diplomacy, the consumption sector, agriculture, foreign trade--for a long time have been playing a politically subordinate role.

Diplomacy--traditionally assigned a purely serving function--gained importance in the course of a foreign policy which in the meantime has become global. In 1973, Foreign Minister A. Gromyko was directly promoted to full membership in

the Politburo. Since then he has been displaying increasing independence, last but not least in dealing with Brezhnev. But diplomacy is just one apparatus among several. It is not immune to big-power thinking. On top of that we have the fact that the party, the military establishment, and the KGB dominate in the entire sensitive area of policies regarding the "socialist community" and the "Third World."

The defense minister has been a full Politburo member since 1972, although he is no longer a "career officer" since Ustinov's appointment in 1976. The right of the military establishment to be consulted and if necessary—as in the case of the SALT negotiations—directly to participate in the drafting of policy in the meantime has been just about institutionalized. The secretary-general—who is the Politburo's spokesman in SALT talks on security issues—is the key broker[30] between the top political leadership and the military establishment, as underscored by his chairmanship of the Supreme Defense Council announced in 1977.

The KGB, the political police likewise, is playing a key role in Soviet security policy: KGB boss Andropov has been a Politburo membership candidate since he took office in 1967 and has been a full member since 1973. At the start of the sixties already—when decolonization aroused new hopes for revolutionary changes worldwide in the Khrushchev regime—the KGB began to tackle a "global" mission. With about half a million personnel and 90,000 agents abroad[31], it is the world's mightiest security and espionage apparatus. (The GRU [Central Intelligence Administration] of the General Staff carries less political weight)[32]. Andropov and his first deputy, K. S. Tsvigun, a Brezhnev protege, who is in charge of the First Main Administration (Foreign Department), obviously also are on the Supreme Defense Council[33].

The "leading role of the party"—guaranteed among other things by staffing all key positions with party members and through control over personnel policy (nomenklatura)—has established limitations on the autonomous "esprit de corps" especially of the government machinery. For example, Gromyko's (second) first deputy V. F Maltsev is not a career diplomat but rather a party functionary. Likewise, about 60 percent of the Soviet "diplomats" abroad are reported to be KGB representatives[34]. (Relationships between the Foreign Ministry and the political police and to party foreign policy were traditionally by no means smooth!) Finally, clique relationships break through the organizational structures although cliques with their protector do climb gradually in the apparatuses in longer-range terms and in the end disappear again. The system is entirely structured toward the predominance of the party apparatus and, within it, it is again organized in favor of the latter's leadership. In the Politburo—originally a pure party body—the party boss or his deputy is the chairman. To this very day, the party has its own foreign-policy institutions: the International Department of the Central Committee under Ponomarev with about 200 personnel and the Department for Communist and Worker Parties under Brezhnev's former assistant Rusakov with about 120 staff members. Chief ideologist Suslov is the top supervisor over party foreign policy and at the same time is Brezhnev's most powerful foreign-policy advisor.

The Central Committee apparatus gathers information from the various bureaucratic channels, such as the party, the foreign ministry, the military establishment, the security service, etc. The Central Committee secretariat drafts the agenda for

the Politburo which Brezhnev if necessary can determine and supplies that body's members with the necessary background documentation. The three government bureaucracies involved in security policy--foreign ministry, defense, and KGB--traditionally report directly to the Politburo (and not to the cabinet). By the way, the Politburo may consult "outside" experts who however are then directed to answer precise factual questions and who are under no circumstances allowed to advocate a line of their own.

The supercentralized party regime--foreign policy in the final analysis is determined by a very small group of powerful leaders--is of course goal-oriented, it does guarantee continuity and professionalism, but it would seem to be extremely clumsy when it comes to learning anything. Centralism and the demand to make scientifically-based decisions furthermore can hinder the correction of any possible mistakes--after all, reputations are at stake. The bureaucratic information system already supplies a distorted picture of the country's own social realities; how much truer must this be when it comes to interpreting foreign countries! The Soviet Union does shine in the collection of intelligence information but it is often weak in analyzing and interpreting such data. Finally there is an extensive lack of civilian counter-analysis so that the leadership in the military and intelligence fields is to a certain sense completely in the hands of its bureaucracies (although the political leaders by no means are lay civilians on such issues).

Supercentralization causes a situation where the top leadership is constantly in danger of being overburdened and overloaded; Lenin already complained about that. The system seems to be politically overloaded when it has to handle more than one big issue at the same time[35]. The system of collective leadership, cultivated under Brezhnev, did block the kind of Khrushchev-style "subjectivism," but it could have its own dysfunctional psychological dynamics--again in favor of orthodoxy and a line which has been adopted.

Because the system, compared to the elected Western governments, needs to pay hardly any attention to an autonomous public, it is potentially highly maneuverable, something which has been pointed out with a warning voice by Zakharov and Solzhenitsyn with a view to the China problem complex. To be sure, a new "1939" --as a product of Stalin's private diplomacy--seems to be less probable today.

During crises, the Soviet Union so far has proven to be quite cautious, basically even under Khrushchev. But an era is now beginning in which, for the first time in its history, it could feel no longer to be weaker but rather to be stronger than its presumed enemies.

Kissinger warned that there are no incentives for self-control in that system[36]. Soviet armament efforts, obviously limited only by the country's economic capacity, seem to speak in favor of such a situation estimate. A country's intentions today are expressed by military research and development expenditures even more so than the already existing "hardware" (which goes back to at least half a decade of earlier decisions)[37]. It has been said that 60-80 percent of the Soviet Union's R&D effort served for armament and space exploration[38]. In addition we have offensive strategic doctrine, deployment, and political-ideological orientation.

On the other hand, increasing professionalization and bureaucratization may have caused the decision-making process to become more cautious (and more cumbersome): the greater the risk, the more does the Soviet Union take its time in mounting its reactions.

The deliberate, go-for-broke game of a man such as Hitler is alien to the Soviet Politburo both by virtue of its ideology and its orientation. On the other hand we cannot rule out the possibility that, on questions of national security, the various apparatuses, instead of blocking each other, might even stir each other up: Afghanistan could be an example of that[39].

4. Mobilization System and the Dilemma of Detente--Is the Soviet Union Expansionist?

The "essence" of a political system, its guiding values, structures, and dynamics are significant if one wishes to estimate its readiness to engage in conflict. In other words, what is the peculiarity of the Soviet single-party system?

Stalin--even more so than Lenin as the real creator of the modern Soviet Union--founded a "mobilization regime" without parallel, whereby he went back to the experiences of war communism. Like the old Moscow state--likewise a historically highly successful mobilization machinery[40] with whose tradition Stalin partly consciously tied in--this new system of universal state service was likewise legitimized in the light of the requirements of foreign and domestic security[41].

It was not really the "ideal organization of the warring state"[42] but rather above all garrison state, a system under a state of siege, a militarized economy (O. Lange): the radical subordination of all particular interests and needs to the all-dominating primacy of national security interests, such as they were defined in an extensively autonomous fashion by the leadership. At the outbreak of the war, the system quite characteristically was effective only in wiping out thousands of presumed potential enemies of the regime through the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]; for the rest, it had to fall back to traditional Russian patriotism during the critical months before Stalingrad (1943). Stalin believed in the primary of the "homefront"; he really wanted to avoid war and when it broke out nevertheless he wanted to end it as quickly as possible. His revolution initially (in contrast to Hitler's revolution) had for the time being been turned inward.

The structures of the Stalinist system proved to be astonishingly stable: that applies to the party apparatus, the organization of heavy industry--whose eight leading ministers in 1974 had a total of more than 200 years of job experience![43] --the political leadership bodies and their methods, etc. A. Zinov'ev thought that such a system could continue to exist "1,000 years." But one would have to add: in isolation. (The same applied to the historical apparatus status)[44].

The price of these bureaucratic command methods was the killing of social initiative--as in old Russia: it produced a "macroinnovation" at the expense of continuing "microinnovations." And, like the Moscow state, it learned this: to continue to remain internationally competitive, it would have to open its doors. The following rather noteworthy line of argument obviously came from the group around Kosygin: all attempts by a state to isolate itself, to disregard the achievements

of science and culture of other countries, would lead "to failure in the economy, to the impoverishment of intellectual life, and to the loss of feeling for reality in politics"[45]. Even the military leaders know this: the system's striking force in the final analysis is based on its economic efficiency.

Only the armament sector proved to be competitive (although the CIA in 1976 observed that it had overestimated its effectiveness for a whole decade) and that sector naturally competes with the outside world. The desired technology transfer also implies a kind of cultural transfer although one cannot really speak of a technological determinism which might force the establishment of certain political structures and organizational forms[46]. Tsarist Russia had already experienced how difficult it can be to control such an originally selectively intended transfer. Today this is true again: any further opening to the outside world endangers the key position precisely of the politically most powerful geographies--the party's monopoly claim to rule, to hold political initiatives and to continue its autonomous organization; the army, which is historically unparalleled with its 4.5 million men (with a growing manpower shortage on top of everything else!), the mighty police repression and informant apparatus. Through detente, B. Ponomarev believes, the West "wanted to open a breach in the socialist world"[47]. Against the background of these political-institutional assumptions, Soviet interest in detente was bound to be limited; all of its apparatuses basically are interested in a minimum of "external threat"--precisely to support integration at home.

But without a gradual reform of the system it seems conceivable that, in a big crisis --such as it might perhaps be triggered by a serious arms race also on the part of the United States--the old policy of bureaucratic "muddling-through" might be out of hand. Each of the big apparatuses however is interested in the preservation of the system in its traditional form.

The political leadership's key role becomes clear against the background of these contradictory determinants of Soviet policy. Only strong leaders were able to push through detente: Stalin in 1946 did feel that his regime was too weakened! Brezhnev personally obviously seriously wanted detente; the unanswered question was what price he was prepared to pay for that. Khrushchev's overthrow was a warning not to injure too many bureaucratic interests at the same time.

The leadership's role makes the time of the transition rule under Brezhnev's followers doubly worrisome. It is not just that his successors need not necessarily share his personal commitment to that cause; due to an at least initially reduced political leeway, the bureaucratic mechanisms, under certain circumstances, will after all triumph over a "conscious" decision. And the big accomplished fact can also originate from many little steps.

The difficult task facing Western policy will be neither to tempt the Soviet Union through obvious weakness nor to plunge it into panic through overreactions. One must not entirely forget the latter possibility either: in 1974, the representatives of the Soviet General Staff painted such a dark picture of the Soviet Union's geostrategic situation that Western observers were almost in consternation[48]. The most important thing above all is to maintain a minimum of communications, even if it has to be in the form of a necessary "counter-analysis from outside."

In 1974 Brezhnev admitted that he had learned a lot[49]. For the time being however both superpowers have been concentrated entirely too one-sidedly on "hard" facts, either the numbers game involved in armaments or, in the case of the Soviet Union, the overestimation of "firm" might and control at the expense of "all imponderables." But technical-military means alone no longer guarantee "security." The "software" of motivations, perceptions, and reactions of the other side deserves much more attention. Probably all of the big mistakes of "intelligence," of information collection and analysis, used to be based on misinterpretations[50]. The Soviet Union itself demonstrates that: there is probably no country that has more information about other countries and no country in many cases misunderstands that information more[51]. But the leeway for misinterpretations has become very narrow.

Afghanistan perhaps initially was not so much the first step in a geostrategic offensive but rather the consequence of a series of misinterpretations[52]. For the time being, the Soviet Union would not seem to be interested in any major confrontation with the United States or, if it wanted such a confrontation, it would not prepare its enemy for that in longer-range terms.

Directive 59 issued by the President of the United States--amounting to an approach to the Soviet concept, in that the leadership centers of the other side in case of a nuclear war had expressly been declared to be targets--encountered vehement reactions from the Soviet leadership without the latter daring to report the full meaning of the new strategy to its own society.

There are thus strong bureaucratic forces in the Soviet Union who have a quasi-institutional interest at least in a certain degree of tension[53], although they are not likely to have any interest in a big war with unpredictable consequences. On the other hand there are however also by no means insignificant system interests in favor of improved cooperation, starting with nuclear crisis management and the problems of runaway arms technology (which for example could call for a new and worrisome on-the-spot judgment leeway for commanders in the field). Whether one considers the Soviet Union to be expansionist is basically a political judgment. There are determinants in the Soviet decision-making behavior--and the system is extremely "government-intensive"--but there are no determinisms. In practice however it is already enough that the Soviet Union appears like a new, expansionist power. Although it can cynically count on the instability and the short memory of democratic policy, in longer-range terms it does run the risk--deriving from the kind of behavior it displayed in Afghanistan--of contributing toward the development of that grand anti-Soviet coalition which has always been a nightmare for all of its leaders.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan. Entstehung und Hintergrund einer weltpolititschen Krise" [Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan--Origin and Background of an International Political Crisis], edited by Heinrich Vogel, Baden-Baden, 1980.

2. Jean-Louis Gahery, "Soviet Strategy in 1978," DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1978, p 26.

Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," in: "The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East," eds. Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, Jerusalem 1973, p 28.

3. In this connection see Astrid von Borcke, "Soviet Union Research and Political Science--Principal Approaches toward the Interpretation of the System of Government Rules," Astrid von Borcke and Gerhard Simon, "Neue Wege der Sowjetunion-Forschung" [New Ways of Soviet Union Research], Baden-Baden, 1980.

4. Concerning Bolshevik tradition, see Astrid von Borcke, "Die Urspruenge des Bolschewismus" [The Origins of Bolshevism], Munich, 1977.

5. Leonid I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol II, Moscow 1974, pp 580-581.

6. Brezhnev in Tula, PRAVDA, 19 January 1977.

7. KOMMUNIST, 15, 1976, p 33.

8. S. N. Yuzhakov in "Russkoye bogatstvo," Jan. 1895, pp 202-203; see von Borcke, "Urspruenge," p 499.

9. See Helmut Sonnenfeldt, IHT, 14 April 1976.

10. DIE WELT, 20 December 1976.

11. See Helmut Dahm, "The Soviet Armed Forces and Change in the Soviet Union's Military Doctrine and Defense Policy," MODERNE WELT [Modern World], Cologne, 1976, pp 271-330; id., "Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan" [Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan] (see footnote 1).

12. See, for example, G. Malinovskiy, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, 24, 1979, p 31.

13. See Grechko's speech, PRAVDA, 9 January 1974.

14. "The Memoirs of Richard Nixon," London, 1978, p 1034.

15. See Astrid von Borcke, "The Soviet Intervention Decision," DIE SOWJETISCHE INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN (see footnote 1).

16. See R. Pipes, "Some Operational Principles" (see footnote 2).

17. Note, PRAVDA, 12 December 1976.

18. See the important essays by T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR, World Politics," 4, 1964, pp 539-557; Stalinism and the Mono-Organizational Society," in "Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation," ed. Robert C. Tucker, New York 1977, pp 77-108; Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society, in: "Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe," ed. Adrew C. Janos, Berkeley 1976, pp 31-80.

19. KOMMUNIST, 12, 1976, p 77.

20. PRAVDA, 19 October 1976.

21. Karl W. Deutsch, "The Nerves of Government," London, 1961, p 40.

22. Raymond L. Garthoff, "La doctrine militaire sovietique" [Soviet Military Doctrine], Paris, 1956, p 228.

23. See Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems," Boulder, Colorado, 1978, especially the essay by William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection," pp 27-52.

24. PRAVDA, 5 July 1975; see also the anonymous article, K., 15, 1976, p 16.

25. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 12, 1976, p 15.

26. Henry Kissinger, "The White House Years," London, 1979, p 789.

27. Loc. cit., pp 16, 27.

28. See the Brezhnev quotation, VOPROSY ISTORII, 12, 1976, p 15; Kulakov's October speech, PRAVDA, 6 November 1976.

29. See the important essay by Alexander Dallin, "Domestic Factors Influencing Soviet Foreign Policy," in "The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East," (see footnote 2), p 38.

30. Michael Checinski, "Die Militaerelite im sowjetischen Entscheidungsprozess" [The Military Elite in the Soviet Decision-Making Process], edited by Astrid von Borcke, soon to be published as a report by the BIOsT [Federal Institute of Eastern and International Studies].

31. TIME, 23 June 1980, p 31.

32. Oleg Penkovskiy, "The Penkovskiy Papers," London, 1965, p 67.

33. NZZ [NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG], 27 December 1978.

34. Penkovskiy, loc. cit., p 23, speaks of a ratio of 2:5 in the embassies; IHT, 24 December 1975, mentions a ratio of 6:4 between representatives of diplomacy and the intelligence services.

35. Kissinger, loc. cit., p 160.

36. Loc. cit. p 791.

37. See J. Isnard, M., 14 January 1977, pp 1 and 2.

38. Richard Armstrong, "Military-Industrial Complex Russian Style," FORTUNE, 1 August 1969, p 124. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Interests in SALT: Institutional and Bureaucratic Considerations," in "Comparative Defense Policy," eds. Frank B. Horton et al., London, 1974, p 116.

39. See Astrid von Borcke, "Die Interventionsentscheidung" (footnote 15).

40. Se Richard Pipes, "Russia under the Old Regime," London, 1974.

41. See T. H. Rigby, "Security and Modernization," in "Survey," 64, 1967, pp 14-33.

42. Robert G. Wesson, "War Communism," in "Survey," 20, 1974, p 111.

43. Wolfe, loc. cit., (see footnote 38), p 120.

44. See Karl A. Wittfogel, "Oriental Despotism," New Haven, 1959.

45. See Astrid von Borcke, "The Kremlin and Detente Policy," MODERNE WELT, 1976, pp 252-270.

46. See Daniel Bell, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society," New York 1973, pp 75-76, 285.

47. K, 11, 1976, p 13.

48. Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," in "Problems of Communism," 1, 1975, p 36.

49. See P, 24 June 1973, p 1, Columns III-IV.

50. See Thomas K. Latimer, "U.S. Intelligence and the Congress," "Strategic Review," summer 1979, pp 47-56.

51. See Sir William Hayter, "Russia and the World," London, 1970, p 16.

52. See the essay by Wolfgang Berner, "Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan," (see footnote 1).

53. Astrid von Borcke, "The Kremlin and Detente Policy" (see footnote 45); id., the "Soviet Union's Domestic Political Situation in 1976-1977," "Sowjetunion 1976/77," Vienna, 1977, especially pp 45-46.

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